Japan

https://www.ft.com/content/91f20534-afdc-11e6-9c37-5787335499a0

US 10Y T

https://www.ft.com/content/073af2b2-a7ac-11e6-8b69-02899e8bd9d1

안근모 - 글로벌 모니터

1. 미국 2, 10 스프레드
http://www.mt.co.kr/view/mtview.php?type=1&no=2016082514164131322&outlink=1

2. 자연실업률, 균형 실업률
http://www.globalmonitor.co.kr/news/news.asp?ct_num=100131216072443&st_section

3. 균형금리

균형금리는 그야말로 딱 적당한 금리수준입니다. 인플레이션을 일으키지도, 실업을 늘리지도 않는 중립적인 수준의 금리죠. 인플레이션을 적용하느냐에 따라 명목과 실질을 나누는데, 보통 명목은 인플레이션 목표치(2%)를 더한 것입니다.

'균형'은 사실 누구도 정확히 알 수 없는, 그러나 존재하는 것으로 추정하는, 이데아(idea)와 같은 추상적인 개념입니다. 이것은 잠재성장률, 잠재 공급능력, 장기 총공급곡선, 자연실업률 등과도 매우 유사한 개념입니다.

그리고 이것은 통화정책으로는 어떻게 할 수 없는 것이라는 의미에서 '자연(natural)'이라는 수식이 붙기도 하죠. 이른바 '화폐 중립성'입니다. 자연은 인간과 대칭되는, 그 스스로 독립해서 존재하는 것이니까요.

그런데 옐런 의장은 이 '실질 균형금리'가 현재 '장기'와 '단기' 두 가지로 나뉘어 있다고 보았습니다. 과거의 normal에서는 딱히 구분할 이유가 없었는데, new normal에서는 달라졌다고 본 것이죠. 

혹독한 금융위기의 후유증, 이력효과가 상당기간 잔존해서 장기 실질 균형금리에 비해 낮은 단기 실질 균형금리가 별도로 존재한다고 보는 것입니다. 물론 장기 실질 균형금리 역시도 금융위기 이전에 비해 낮아졌다고 보고 있죠.

비유를 하자면, 나이가 들어서 체력이 떨어졌는 상태인데, 최근에 큰 사고를 당해서 입원을 하는 바람에 일시적으로 더 떨어진 상태라고 보는 겁니다. 

그래서 이렇게 이중으로 체력이 떨어진 상태에서는 봄이 오고 기온이 올라가도 보일러는 계속 가동해야 하고, 외투는 천천히 벗어야 하며, 한여름이 된 뒤에도, 사고로 손상된 체력이 완전히 회복될 때까지 일정기간 동안에는 긴 소매 옷을 계속 입을 수밖에 없다고 보는 겁니다. 

이러한 판단에 따른 금리전략이 FOMC 성명서에 다음과 같은 문구로 매번 등장합니다. 

"연방기금금리는 아마도 얼마동안에는 장기적으로 지배적일 것으로 예상되는 수준보다 낮게 유지될 것으로 예상된다."

위 문구에서 '장기적으로 지배적일 것으로 예상되는 수준'의 금리가 바로 장기 균형금리인 것이죠. 그런데 '아마도 얼마동안에는' 경제가 완전고용과 물가안정을 동시에 달성하는데 요구되는 균형 금리는 '장기 지배적인' 것에 비해 낮을 것이라는 겁니다. 

그래서 이번 금리인상 사이클은 장기 균형금리에 못 미치는 선에서 일단 중단된다는 예고를 미리부터 해 놓고 있는 것입니다. 

주목할 것은 이 '단기 균형금리'의 경우는 경기 순환적 요인에 의해 일시적으로 저하된 것으로 본다는 점입니다. 즉, 이 부분에 관해서는 화폐정책의 여지가 있다는 것이죠. 

그래서 경제를 일정 수준으로 오버슈팅 시키면 단기 균형금리도 장기 균형을 향해 살아 올라간다고 보는 것이 옐런의 생각입니다. 

그러나 문제는 그 희망이 차츰 옅어지고 있다는 점이죠. 경기순환적으로 일시 저하된 것이 아니라, 글로벌 요인에 의해 구조적으로 낮아져 있는 것 아니냐 하는 고민이 커지고 있는 겁니다. 그렇다면 금리는 '아마도 얼마동안'을 지나서도 더 이상 올리지 못하는 것이죠. 

'자연'을 이렇게 이렇게 '단기'와 '장기'로 나눈 사례는 미국 의회예산국(CBO)의 자연실업률 추정치에도 있습니다. CBO는 금융위기 직후 일정기간동안 미국의 자연실업률이 뛰어 올랐는데, 이 일정기간동안 단기와 장기로 구분되면서, 단기 자연실업률이 장기에 비해 훨씬 큰 폭으로 상승한 것으로 추정했습니다. 

자연실업률과 NAIRU(인플레이션을 유발하지 않고 도달할 수 있는 최저의 실업률)를 각각 장기 및 단기 균형실업률이라고 구분해서 보는 시각도 있습니다. 자연실업률은 화폐중립적이지만, NAIRU는 화폐정책의 영향을 받는다고 보는 것이죠.

Hyungsok Ahn - 20160711

http://www.yatedo.com/p/Hyungsok+Ahn/normal/4c6c2b8df7c8ad97d651d7852babc25d

Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke -2013

Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke Before the Japan Society of Monetary Economics, Tokyo, Japan May 31, 2003Some Thoughts on Monetary Policy in Japan

I am delighted to address this meeting of the Japan Society of Monetary Economics. I would particularly like to thank Professor Shimizu both for inviting me and for helping to arrange a series of meetings with officials at the Bank of Japan, the Ministry of Finance, and the Financial Services Agency. Those meetings have given me a first-hand look at the difficult challenges that the current economic situation poses for Japan's leaders and for the Japanese people. The economic situation here is indeed enormously complex. It involves not only structural, monetary, and fiscal problems but also underlying political and social forces, which have at times limited the flexibility of policy. The sometimes frustratingly slow pace of change in Japan is all the more reason, however, for this nation's economists to speak out and present clear, persuasive arguments that will help guide the policy debate and urge leaders to effective action. At stake is not only the economic health of your country but also, to a significant degree, the prosperity of the rest of the world. From my side of the ocean, it seems that many people are looking to the United States to take the responsibility for leading the world into economic recovery. Clearly, however, faster growth in Japan and other major industrial countries would support a stronger, more balanced, and more durable recovery than one driven by U.S. growth alone. Although changes in macroeconomic policy in Japan during the past decade have generally been slow and deliberate, there has also been some willingness to experiment, not least by the Bank of Japan (BOJ). For this reason, the recent appointment of a new leadership team at the BOJ has stimulated considerable interest and expectation around the world. Although Governor Fukui and his colleagues have so far not made radical breaks with previous BOJ policies, there is reason to hope that they will be open to fresh ideas and approaches. In that spirit, my remarks today will be focused on opportunities for monetary policy innovation in Japan, including specifically the possibility of more-active monetary-fiscal cooperation to end deflation. In focusing primarily on macroeconomic policies and the deflation problem, however, I do not wish to imply that more microeconomic measures--such as bank restructuring and recapitalization, development of more liquid capital markets, revitalization of the distressed corporate sector, and broader structural reform--are not essential and urgent. < microeconomic measures> - bank restructuring - recapitalization - development of more liquid capital markets - revitalization of distressed corporate sector - broader structural reform ===> Not essential and urgent! Indeed, all these elements are crucial if Japan's economy is to return to a more satisfactory rate of growth. However, I do think that ending deflation and carrying out banking, financial, corporate, and structural reforms can and should be pursued on parallel tracks, with progress being made wherever possible.  Indeed, a definitive end to the deflation in consumer prices--by restoring confidence and stimulating spending--would do much to help moderate the unemployment and financial distress that might otherwise arise as the results of aggressive programs of reform and restructuring. I preface the body of my remarks with two important caveats. First, the opinions I give today are strictly my own and should not be attributed to my colleagues on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve or on the Federal Open Market Committee; nor do they reflect any official position of the United States government. Second, the remarks that follow were prepared before my visit to Japan and therefore do not reflect the discussions that I held this week with Japanese officials. Obviously, then, no inference should be made about those meetings from the comments to follow.1 Today I would like to consider three related issues that bear on contemporary monetary policy in Japan. First, I will discuss the option of asking the Bank of Japan to announce a quantitative objective for prices, as well as how such an objective might best be structured. Rather than proposing the more familiar inflation target, I will suggest that the BOJ consider adopting a price-level target, which would imply a period of reflation to offset the effects on prices of the recent period of deflation. 인플레이션 타겟을 제안하기 보단 BOJ가  price-level을 타게팅 하기를 제안한다. price-level targeting ==> 최근 벌어지고 있는 가격 deflation 에 대한 효과를 상쇄 시키는 통화팽창 시기(period of reflation)를 의미함 Inflation targeting을 하기에는 너무 안좋은 시기. 좀 더 강한 팽창 정책. 과거 inflation targeting 과 price targeting 이 함께 가던 시기로 회복 시킬 정도로 확장 정책  Second, I would like to consider an important institutional issue, which is the relationship between the condition of the Bank of Japan's balance sheet and its ability to undertake more aggressive monetary policies. Although, in principle, balance-sheet considerations should not seriously constrain central bank policies, in practice they do. However, as I will discuss, relatively simple measures that would eliminate this constraint are available.  Finally, and most important, I will consider one possible strategy for ending the deflation in Japan: explicit, though temporary, cooperation between the monetary and the fiscal authorities. 1. Inflation-rate targeting 말고 Price-rate targeting 을 하고 2. Balance sheet 걱정하는데 고거에 대해 이야기 할 것 이고 3. Cooperation between the monetary and the fiscal authorities! What Objective for Japanese Monetary Policy? Before setting off on a trip, one should know one's destination. In that spirit, a discussion of Japanese monetary policy should begin with some discussion of the policy objective. I leave until later how the objective can be achieved. The Bank of Japan Law, passed in 1998, sets price stability as a primary objective for the central bank. As with our own Federal Reserve Act, price stability is not, however, precisely defined in the Law. Currently, the BOJ has promised that the zero-interest-rate policy will be maintained until deflation is brought to an end, a policy that might be deemed consistent with the price stability objective. Two objections to this conclusion might be raised, however.  First, the BOJ's statement seems to imply that the current level of policy stimulus might start to be withdrawn as soon as measured inflation returns to zero; in particular, no explicit(솔직한) commitment(약속) has been made to maintain inflation at zero, much less at some positive rate, in the longer run. But the presence of measurement bias in Japanese price indexes suggest that a measured inflation rate of at least one percent is likely required in order to achieve true price stability in the long run. Moreover, inflation above zero will be needed if real interest rates in Japan are to be negative for a period, as many observers think is necessary for full recovery. In short, it would be helpful if the zero-interest-rate policy were more explicit about what happens after the deflationary period ends. Second, over the past five years, since the onset of the current deflationary episode--and, incidentally, since the passage of the new Bank of Japan Law--the price level has trended down, registering a cumulative decline (depending on the price index) of between 4 and 9 percent. For example, over this period the GDP deflator has dropped nearly 9 percent, the private consumption deflator has fallen 5-1/2 percent, and wages and salaries are down 4-1/2 percent. One might argue that the legal objective of price stability should require not only a commitment to stabilize prices in the future but also a policy of actively reflating the economy, in order to restore the price level that prevailed prior to the prolonged period of deflation. As you may know, I have advocated explicit inflation targets, or at least a quantitative definition of price stability, for other leading central banks, including the Federal Reserve. A quantitative inflation target or range has been shown in many countries to be a valuable tool for communication. By clarifying the objectives of the central bank, an explicit inflation target can help to focus and anchor inflation expectations, reduce uncertainty in financial markets, and add structure to the policy framework. For Japan, given the recent history of costly deflation, however, an inflation target may not go far enough. A better strategy for Japanese monetary policy might be a publicly announced, gradually rising price-level target. What I have in mind is that the Bank of Japan would announce its intention to restore the price level (as measured by some standard index of prices, such as the consumer price index excluding fresh food) to the value it would have reached if, instead of the deflation of the past five years, a moderate inflation of, say, 1 percent per year had occurred. (I choose 1 percent to allow for the measurement bias issue noted above, and because a slightly positive average rate of inflation reduces the risk of future episodes of sustained deflation.) Note that the proposed price-level target is a moving target, equal in the year 2003 to a value approximately 5 percent above the actual price level in 1998 and rising 1 percent per year thereafter.2 Because deflation implies falling prices while the target price-level rises, the failure to end deflation in a given year has the effect of increasing what I have called the price-level gap (Bernanke, 2000). The price-level gap is the difference between the actual price level and the price level that would have obtained if deflation had been avoided and the price stability objective achieved in the first place. Def> Price level gap = actual price level - deflation 이 없었다면 도달해 있을 price level A successful effort to eliminate the price-level gap would proceed, roughly, in two stages. During the first stage, the inflation rate would exceed the long-term desired inflation rate, as the price-level gap was eliminated and the effects of previous deflation undone. Call this the reflationary phase of policy. Second, once the price-level target was reached, or nearly so, the objective for policy would become a conventional inflation target or a price-level target that increases over time at the average desired rate of inflation.3 Although restoration of the pre-deflation price level by means of a price-level target might be a reasonable interpretation of the BOJ's price stability objective, I would not want to push the purely legal argument too far. For example, based on a mandate for price stability, I would not ask either the BOJ or the Federal Reserve to restore the price level prevailing in their respective nations in 1950! Rather, I think the BOJ should consider a policy of reflation before re-stabilizing at a low inflation rate primarily because of the economic benefits of such a policy. One benefit of reflation would be to ease some of the intense pressure on debtors and on the financial system more generally. Since the early 1990s, borrowers in Japan have repeatedly found themselves squeezed by disinflation or deflation, which has required them to pay their debts in yen of greater value than they had expected. Borrower distress has affected the functioning of the whole economy, for example by weakening the banking system and depressing investment spending. Of course, declining asset values and the structural problems of Japanese firms have contributed greatly to debtors' problems as well, but reflation would, nevertheless, provide some relief. A period of reflation would also likely provide a boost to profits and help to break the deflationary psychology among the public, which would be positive factors for asset prices as well. Reflation--that is, a period of inflation above the long-run preferred rate in order to restore the earlier price level--proved highly beneficial following the deflations of the 1930s in both Japan and the United States. Finance Minister Korekiyo Takahashi brilliantly rescued Japan from the Great Depression through reflationary policies in the early 1930s, while President Franklin D. Roosevelt's reflationary monetary and banking policies did the same for the United States in 1933 and subsequent years. In both cases, the turnaround was amazingly rapid. In the United States, for example, prices fell at a 10.3 percent rate in 1932 but rose 0.8 percent in 1933 and more briskly thereafter. Moreover, during the year that followed Roosevelt's inauguration in March 1933, the U.S. stock market rallied by 77 percent. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) have advanced a second argument for a price-level target for Japan in an important recent paper on monetary policy at the zero bound. These authors point out (as have many others) that, when nominal interest rates are at or near zero, the central bank can lower the real rate of interest only by creating expectations of inflation on the part of the public. Eggertsson and Woodford argue that a publicly announced price-level target of the type just described is more conducive to raising near-term inflation expectations than is an inflation target.4 One way to understand their argument is to imagine that the public expects the leaders of the central bank to take more aggressive actions, the further they are from their announced objective. Now suppose that, in an economy experiencing a stable deflation, the central bank leadership announces a fixed inflation target but then makes no progress toward that target during a given period. Then in the next period, the central bank is in the same position as previously, in terms of its distance from its objective; hence, by hypothesis, the central bank has no incentive to increase its effort to meet the announced target, and the public has no reason to expect it to do so. In this respect the inflation target is too "forgiving" an objective; failure is not penalized, nor is greater effort demanded. In contrast, under a price-level-targeting scheme, continuing deflation combined with an upward-sloping path for the price-level target causes the size of the price-level gap to increase over time. Thus, failure by the central bank to meet its target in a given period leads to expectations of (and public demands for) increased effort in subsequent periods--greater quantities of assets purchased on the open market, for example. So even if the central bank is reluctant to provide a time frame for meeting its objective, the structure of the price-level objective provides a means for the bank to commit to increasing its anti-deflationary efforts when its earlier efforts prove unsuccessful. As Eggertsson and Woodford show, the expectation that an increasing price level gap will give rise to intensified effort by the central bank should lead the public to believe that ultimately inflation will replace deflation, a belief that supports the central bank's own objectives by lowering the current real rate of interest. A concern that one might have about price-level targeting, as opposed to more conventional inflation targeting, is that it requires a short-term inflation rate that is higher than the long-term inflation objective. Is there not some danger of inflation overshooting, so that a deflation problem is replaced with an inflation problem? No doubt this concern has some basis, and ultimately one has to make a judgment. However, on the other side of the scale, I would put the following points: first, the benefits to the real economy of a more rapid restoration of the pre-deflation price level and second, the fact that the publicly announced price-level targets would help the Bank of Japan manage public expectations and to draw the distinction between a one-time price-level correction and the BOJ's longer-run inflation objective. If this distinction can be made, the effect of the reflation program on inflation expectations and long-term nominal interest rates should be smaller than if all reflation is interpreted as a permanent increase in inflation. A Barrier to More Aggressive Policies: The BOJ's Balance Sheet Discussing the optimal objectives for Japanese monetary policy is all very well, but what of the argument, advanced by some officials, that the Bank of Japan lacks the tools to achieve these objectives? Without denying the many difficulties inherent in making monetary policy in the current environment in Japan, I believe that not all the possible methods for easing monetary policy in Japan have been fully exploited. One possible approach to ending deflation in Japan would be greater cooperation, for a limited time, between the monetary and the fiscal authorities. Specifically, the Bank of Japan should consider increasing still further its purchases of government debt, preferably in explicit conjunction with a program of tax cuts or other fiscal stimulus. Before going into more detail about this possibility, however, I want to discuss a specific institutional factor that currently constrains--somewhat artificially, I would argue--the ability of the Bank of Japan to pursue more aggressive policies, including both so-called non-conventional and more-orthodox policies. This institutional constraint, often cited by BOJ officials, is the condition of the BOJ's balance sheet, and the fear, in particular, that a successful program of reflation might inflict capital losses on the BOJ and thereby weaken its institutional position. Like other central banks, the Bank of Japan has a balance sheet, with assets, liabilities, and capital. Also like other central banks, the BOJ purchases interest-bearing assets with money that it creates and thus typically earns significant profits, or seignorage. Some of these profits are used to cover the expenses of the BOJ itself, subject to review by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The BOJ also has reserves for possible losses on securities and foreign exchange transactions and is permitted by the Article 53 of the Bank of Japan Law to retain 5 percent of the surplus from the settlement of profits and losses as a reserve fund. The portion of the surplus not retained by the Bank is paid to the national treasury. From the point of view of conventional private-sector accounting--which, as I will discuss, is not necessarily the correct standard in this case--the BOJ's balance sheet has become noticeably riskier in recent years. For example, the BOJ's most recent financial statement showed that of the 68 percent of its assets held in the form of government securities, about two-thirds are long-term Japanese government bonds (JGBs). This represents a very substantial increase over customary levels in the BOJ's holdings of long-term government debt. Because yields on government bonds are currently so low, these holdings expose the BOJ's balance sheet to considerable interest-rate risk (although any losses would be partly offset by unrealized capital gains on earlier acquisitions of bonds). Indeed, ironically, if the Bank of Japan were to succeed in replacing deflation with a low but positive rate of inflation, its reward would likely be substantial capital losses in the value of its government bond holdings arising from the resulting increase in long-term nominal interest rates. ------------------------ With such concerns in mind, BOJ officials have said that a strengthening of the Bank's capital base is needed to allow it to pursue more aggressive monetary policy easing. In fact, the BOJ recently requested that it be allowed to retain 15 percent (rather than 5 percent) of the surplus for the 2002 fiscal year that just ended to increase its capital, and the Ministry of Finance has indicated that it will approve the request. Even with this additional cushion, however, concerns on the part of the BOJ about its balance sheet are likely to remain. The public debate over the BOJ's capital should not distract us from the underlying economics of the situation. In particular, the private shareholders notwithstanding, the Bank of Japan is not a private commercial bank. It cannot go bankrupt in the sense that a private firm can, and the usual reasons that a commercial bank holds capital--to reduce incentives for excessive risk-taking, for example--do not directly apply to the BOJ.5 Indeed, putting aside psychological and symbolic reasons, important as these may be in some circumstances, there appear to be only two conceivable effects of the BOJ's balance sheet position on its ability to conduct normal operations. First, if the BOJ's income were too low to support its current expenditure budget, the Bank might be forced to ask the MOF for supplemental funds, which the BOJ might fear would put its independence at risk. This consideration by itself should not necessarily make the BOJ less willing to undertake more aggressive monetary policies, however, because purchasing additional assets with non-zero yields, even if these assets are risky or illiquid, normally increases the Bank's current income. Second, an imaginable, though quite unlikely, possibility is that the Bank could suffer sufficient capital losses on its assets to make it unable to conduct open-market sales of securities on a scale large enough to meet its monetary policy objectives. In short, one could make an economic case that the balance sheet of the central bank should be of marginal relevance at best to the determination of monetary policy. Rather than engage in what would probably be a heated and unproductive debate over the issue, however, I would propose instead that the Japanese government just fix the problem, thereby eliminating this concern from the BOJ's list of worries. There are many essentially costless ways to fix it. I am intrigued by a simple proposal that I understand has been suggested by the Japanese Business Federation, the Nippon Keidanren. Under this proposal the Ministry of Finance would convert the fixed interest rates of the Japanese government bonds held by the Bank of Japan into floating interest rates. This "bond conversion"--actually, a fixed-floating interest rate swap--would protect the capital position of the Bank of Japan from increases in long-term interest rates and remove much of the balance sheet risk associated with open-market operations in government securities. Moreover, the budgetary implications of this proposal would be essentially zero, since any increase in interest payments to the BOJ by the MOF arising from the bond conversion would be offset by an almost equal increase in the BOJ's payouts to the national treasury.6 The budgetary neutrality of the proposal is of course a consequence of the fact that, as a matter of arithmetic, any capital gains or losses in the value of government securities held by the BOJ are precisely offset by opposite changes in the net worth of the issuer of those securities, the government treasury. Although the MOF could insulate, without budgetary cost, the BOJ's balance sheet from interest-rate risk on its holdings of government bonds, a similar program offered by the MOF to private-sector holders of bonds, such as commercial banks, would not be costless from the MOF's point of view, if inflation and interest rates were subsequently to rise.7 However, if the MOF entered into the proposed swap agreement with the BOJ, new purchases of government bonds from the private sector by the Bank of Japan would be costless to the national treasury. Thus, conditional on the swap arrangement being in force, open-market purchases of government bonds by the BOJ would combine an expansionary monetary policy with a reduction of interest-rate risk in the banking system at no budgetary cost.8 The simple step of immunizing the BOJ's balance sheet thus opens a number of interesting policy options. The bond conversion (or interest-rate swap) just described is all that would be needed to protect the BOJ's balance sheet against any side effects from operations in government bonds. Incidentally, the approach could be extended to insulate the BOJ's balance sheet against potentially adverse effects of other types of asset purchases that the government might want to encourage. For example, to facilitate expanded purchases of asset-backed commercial paper, the government might agree, on request of the BOJ, to exchange government debt of the same maturity for the commercial paper. The net effect would be that the fiscal authority would assume the credit risk flowing from the nonstandard monetary policy action, as seems appropriate. What should the Bank of Japan give up in exchange for the Ministry of Finance's removing a significant amount of risk from the BOJ's balance sheet? One option would be for the Bank to use its increased ability to bear risk to undertake new policy actions that would entail accepting other types of risk onto its balance sheet. Today I will argue for a different approach and suggest that the Bank of Japan cooperate temporarily with the government to create an environment of combined monetary and fiscal ease to end deflation and help restart economic growth in Japan. To do this, the BOJ might have to scrap rules that it has set for itself--for example, its informal rule that the quantity of long-term government bonds on its balance sheet must be kept below the outstanding balance of banknotes issued. Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation There is no unique solution to the problem of continuing declines in Japanese prices; a variety of policies are worth trying, alone or in combination. However, one fairly direct and practical approach is explicit (though temporary) cooperation between the monetary and the fiscal authorities. Let me try to explain why I think this direction is promising and may succeed where monetary and fiscal policies applied separately have not. Demand on the part of both consumers and potential purchasers of new capital equipment in Japan remains quite depressed, and resources are not being fully utilized. Normally, the central bank would respond to such a situation by lowering the short-term nominal interest rate, but that rate is now effectively zero. Other strategies for the central bank acting alone exist, including buying alternative assets to try to lower term or liquidity premiums and attempting to influence expectations of future inflation through announcements or commitments to expand the monetary base. The Bank of Japan has taken some steps in these directions but has generally been reluctant to go as far as it might, in part because of the difficulty in determining the quantitative impact of such actions and in part because of the Bank's view that problems in the banking system have "jammed" the usual channels of monetary policy transmission. Ironically, this obvious reluctance on the part of the BOJ to sail into uncharted waters may have had the effect of muting the psychological impact of the nonstandard actions it has taken. Likewise the Bank of Japan has resisted calls to manage the value of the yen (see, for example, McCallum, 2000, or Svensson, 2001), citing its lack of authority to do so as well as the prospect of retaliation from trading partners. The alternative approach to stimulating aggregate demand is fiscal policy--government spending increases or tax cuts. Here again the perception is that policy has been less than successful, although Posen (1998)--in a criticism reminiscent of those who have complained that the Bank of Japan should just "do more"--has argued that the problem is less that fiscal policy is ineffective than that it has not been used to the extent that one might gather from official plans and announcements. In Posen's view, Japan's debt problem is primarily the result of slow economic growth rather than active fiscal policies. However, besides possibly inconsistent application of fiscal stimulus, another reason for weak fiscal effects in Japan may be the well-publicized size of the government debt. The severity of the government debt problem may be overstated in some respects--95 percent of the outstanding debt is domestically held, for example, and 59 percent is held by public institutions, so that the Japanese people truly "owe the debt to themselves"--but that the government's annual deficit is now about 8 percent of GDP is nevertheless a serious concern. Moreover, an aging Japanese population will add to the government's budgetary burden in coming decades. In addition to making policymakers more reluctant to use expansionary fiscal policies in the first place, Japan's large national debt may dilute the effect of fiscal policies in those instances when they are used. For example, people may be more inclined to save rather than spend tax cuts when they know that the cuts increase future government interest costs and thus raise future tax payments for themselves or their children. (It is striking that, despite low interest rates, about 20 percent of the Japanese central government budget, or about 16.8 trillion yen this year, is devoted to servicing the national debt.) In economics textbooks, the idea that people will save rather than spend tax cuts because of the implied increase in future tax obligations is known as the principle of Ricardian equivalence. In general, the evidence for Ricardian equivalence in real economies is mixed, but it seems most likely to apply in a situation like that prevailing today in Japan, in which people have been made highly aware of the potential burden of the national debt. The principle of Ricardian equivalence does not apply exactly to increases in government purchases (for example, road building) but it may apply there approximately. If, for example, people think that government spending projects are generally wasteful and add little to national wealth or productivity, then taxpayers may view increased government spending as simply increasing the burden of the government debt that they must bear. If, as a result, they react to increases in government spending by reducing their own expenditure, the net stimulative effect of fiscal actions will be reduced. In short, to strengthen the effects of fiscal policy, it would be helpful to break the link between expansionary fiscal actions today and increases in the taxes that people expect to pay tomorrow. My thesis here is that cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities in Japan could help solve the problems that each policymaker faces on its own. Consider for example a tax cut for households and businesses that is explicitly coupled with incremental BOJ purchases of government debt--so that the tax cut is in effect financed by money creation. Moreover, assume that the Bank of Japan has made a commitment, by announcing a price-level target, to reflate the economy, so that much or all of the increase in the money stock is viewed as permanent.9 Under this plan, the BOJ's balance sheet is protected by the bond conversion program, and the government's concerns about its outstanding stock of debt are mitigated because increases in its debt are purchased by the BOJ rather than sold to the private sector. Moreover, consumers and businesses should be willing to spend rather than save the bulk of their tax cut: They have extra cash on hand, but--because the BOJ purchased government debt in the amount of the tax cut--no current or future debt service burden has been created to imply increased future taxes. Essentially, monetary and fiscal policies together have increased the nominal wealth of the household sector, which will increase nominal spending and hence prices. The health of the banking sector is irrelevant to this means of transmitting the expansionary effect of monetary policy, addressing the concern of BOJ officials about "broken" channels of monetary transmission. This approach also responds to the reservation of BOJ officials that the Bank "lacks the tools" to reach a price-level or inflation target. Isn't it irresponsible to recommend a tax cut, given the poor state of Japanese public finances? To the contrary, from a fiscal perspective, the policy would almost certainly be stabilizing, in the sense of reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio. The BOJ's purchases would leave the nominal quantity of debt in the hands of the public unchanged, while nominal GDP would rise owing to increased nominal spending. Indeed, nothing would help reduce Japan's fiscal woes more than healthy growth in nominal GDP and hence in tax revenues. Potential roles for monetary-fiscal cooperation are not limited to BOJ support of tax cuts. BOJ purchases of government debt could also support spending programs, to facilitate industrial restructuring, for example. The BOJ's purchases would mitigate the effect of the new spending on the burden of debt and future interest payments perceived by households, which should reduce the offset from decreased consumption. More generally, by replacing interest-bearing debt with money, BOJ purchases of government debt lower current deficits and interest burdens and thus the public's expectations of future tax obligations. Of course, one can never get something for nothing; from a public finance perspective, increased monetization of government debt simply amounts to replacing other forms of taxes with an inflation tax. But, in the context of deflation-ridden Japan, generating a little bit of positive inflation (and the associated increase in nominal spending) would help achieve the goals of promoting economic recovery and putting idle resources back to work, which in turn would boost tax revenue and improve the government's fiscal position. Conclusion The Bank of Japan became fully independent only in 1998, and it has guarded its independence carefully, as is appropriate. Economically, however, it is important to recognize that the role of an independent central bank is different in inflationary and deflationary environments. In the face of inflation, which is often associated with excessive monetization of government debt, the virtue of an independent central bank is its ability to say "no" to the government. With protracted deflation, however, excessive money creation is unlikely to be the problem, and a more cooperative stance on the part of the central bank may be called for. Under the current circumstances, greater cooperation for a time between the Bank of Japan and the fiscal authorities is in no way inconsistent with the independence of the central bank, any more than cooperation between two independent nations in pursuit of a common objective is inconsistent with the principle of national sovereignty. I have argued today that a quid pro quo, in which the MOF acts to immunize the BOJ's balance sheet from interest-rate risk and the BOJ increases its purchases of government debt, is a good way to attack the ongoing deflation in Japan. I would like to close by reiterating a point I made earlier--that ending deflation in consumer prices is only part of what needs to be done to put Japan back on the path to full recovery. Banking and structural reform are crucial and need to be carried out as soon and as aggressively as possible. Although the importance of reforms cannot be disputed, however, I do not agree with those who have argued that deflation is only a minor part of the overall problem in Japan. Addressing the deflation problem would bring substantial real and psychological benefits to the Japanese economy, and ending deflation would make solving the other problems that Japan faces only that much easier. For the sake of the world's economy as well as Japan's, I hope that progres

Brexit : The Morning After

2016.06.24
by Paul Krugman

1. Economics
- Brexit will make Britain poorer. It will be substantial.
- Market access 에 대한 assurance가 그 나라에 대한 장기 투자에 큰 영향을 미치는 것을 알고 있다. 영국은 이번 브렉시트로 이런 assurance를 걷어차 버렸기 때문에 불이익을 받게 되고 이는 곧 생산성을 떨어뜨릴 것이다.
==>  market access 에 대한 assurance가 무슨말이지??

- 그러나 시장은 지금 파운드화의 폭락이나 영국 경제 침체와 같은 당장의 파급 효과에 대해서만 이야기 하고 있다. 파운드가 평소의 움짐임에 비해 크게 움직인건 사실이다. 그러나 emerging-market crisis를 경험해본 입장에서 이번 움직임은 그때에 비해서 큰 움짐임은 아님을 알 수 있다. 사실 영국 자체만 보더라도 역사적으로 크게 움직였던 움직임에 비해서는 크지 않았다. 70년대 및 1992년에 더 큰 움직임이 있었었다. 최근 5년간 파운드 차트를 보더라도 이번 하락은 world-class 급 하락은 아님을 알 수 있다.

- 더욱이 영국은 자국 통화로 회계 장부를 작성하는 나라이기 때문에 페소화 급락으로 인해 경제에 엄청난 타격을 입었던 아르헨티나와 같은 일을 일어나지 않을 것 이다.  브렉시트로 인해 자본이 급격하게 유출되고 이자율이 급등하는 일은 일어나지 않았다.

- 최근 5년간 영국 10년 채권의 이자율을 봐라.

- 전세계 주식 시장이 망가 졌고 채권 이자율을 더 낮아 졌다. 이런 현상은 중앙은행이 통화 정책을 매우 losse하게 유지 시키도록 할텐데 뭘 걱정해야 하나?

- 한가지 걱정으로 작용할 수 있는 것은 불확실성이 투자 심리를 위축 시킬 수 있다는 점이다.

2. Politics
- 사실 큰 문제는 영국과 유럽에 있어서 정치적인 이슈일 수 있다.
- 이번 사건으로 인해 유럽의 큰 프로젝트인, 경제의 통합을 통해 정치 통합을 이루고자 하는 노력은 굉장히 큰 곤경에 처하게 되었다. 브렉시트는 아마 populist/separist/xenophobic 운동들이 힘을 얻게 만드는 시발점이 될 것 이다. Secular stagnation으로 향하는 구조적인 유럽의 문제에 더해 이러한 정치적 이슈는 투자를 더욱더 꺼리게 만들 것 이다. 많은 사람들이 유럽의 미래에 대해 비관적이고 나또한 마찬가지 이다.
- 사실 이런 문제들은 Bremain이 되었더라고 할지라도 딱히 달라지지는 않았을 것이기는 하다.
- 다시 크루그먼 아저씨가 맨날 하는 이야기 등장

The big mistakes were the adoption of the euro without careful thought about 
1. how a single currency would work without a unified government; 
2. the disastrous framing of the euro crisis as a morality play brought on by irresponsible southerners; 
3. the establishment of free labor mobility among culturally diverse countries with very different income levels, without careful thought about how that would work. 

- 사실 브렉시트 사건 자체는 영국이 아니었다면 다른 어느 유럽 국가에서 나타 났을 단지 시간문제 였을 것 이다.
- 불필요한 데미지를 총리의 어리석은 판단으로 인해 얻게 된건 UK 자신이다.

So calm down about the short-run macroeconomics; grieve for Europe, but you should have been doing that already; worry about Britain.

Investing with style - AQR

https://www.aqr.com/library/journal-articles/investing-with-style

1. Most existing portfolios, even seemingly diversfied ones, are dominated by equity risk.
  - EX> 60/40 Stock/bond portfolio is 0.99 correlated to a 100% stock portfolio.

2. 전통적인 자산 고유의 수익률이 매우 낮아져 있다. Consequently, investors have turned their attentions to alternative sources of return, specifically those attempting to be uncorrelated with traditional assets.

3. One way to achieve uncorrelated returns is to seek pure "alpha"
  - In theory, alpha is the extra return achieved beyond any known risks or common systematic strategies. .... Unfortunately, alpha is at best elusive and, more often than not, illusive.

4. 알파를 찾는 어려운 일에 대한 이야기는 제쳐 두고, 이 페이퍼에서는 "Style" 이라고 부르는 기존 자산과 상관관계가 없고 positive return 을 만드는 충분히 입증된 전략에 대해 이야기를 해보자.

5. Def of Style
  - We define a style as a disciplined and systematic method of investing that produces unique long-term positive returns across markets and asset classes, with low to zero correlation with major long-only assets, backed by significant scientific evidence, both in- and out-of sample, and with strong economic intuition underlying it

6. 이것저것 찾아내려고 많은 사람들이 도전을 했고 나름 많은 것들을 발견했으나 DATA-MINING 의 한계에서 벗어나지 못한 것들이 대부분이다. 그러나 많은 정교한 테스트들을 통과한 Style 들이 있으니 그건 바로 value, momentum, carry, and defensive

7.  이 네개의 팩터를 이용해서 펀드를 만들었는데 다른 유명한 두 팩터인 size 및 illiquidity 팩터를 뺀 이유
- size : 수익이 robust 하지 않다. & Size cannot be easily applied across other asset classes such as currencies or commodities and entails betting to a large degree on less ilquid securies
- illiquidity

8. Identifying robust return sources is the first ingredient of successful style premia investing, and finding consistent evidence in many markets and asset classes achieve this aim.

9. Leverage, shorting, and derivatives are necessary to achieve these important objectives efficiently. Hence, putting together a portfolio of style premia requires careful portfolio design, proper portfolio construction, effective implementation and cost control, as well as sound risk management.

10.

투자는 -from JI

투자는 단순하지만 쉽지 않다.
하지만 겸손하게 열심히 하다보면 어느날 부쩍 성장한 본인을 마주할 거라 믿는다.
- JI

AQR - Shareholder Letter(2015)

1. AQR Equity Market Netural Fund
- provide investors with returns from potential gains of its long and short equity.
- Investment thems
  - Investor Sentiment
  - Stability
  - Country-Industry Pairs
  - Momentum-related themes(within industry, across industry and indirect Momentum)
  - Value signals within and across industries underperformed slightly
- 수익률 매우 우수


2. AQR GLOBAL MACRO
- invests four liquid asset classes : Fixed income, currencies, commodities and equities
- Within these asset class, we take both relative value and directional positions
- The strategy is long-term market-neutral, but can take directional views over the short term.
- The Funds' strategy trades predominately on macroeconomic news and trends, usuing a systematic, bottom-up approach that integrates quantitative and discretionary trading signals
- Investment philosophy : the insight that financial markets tend to underreact to macroeconomic news. ( This implies that macroeconomic news tens to have a persistent effect on asset prices. )
- Dax 롱 S&P 숏 쳐서 깨먹었다.

3. AQR Long-Short Equity Fund
- Using three different sources of return
1) the potential gains from its long/short equity positions by entering into Total Return Basket Swaps
2) overall exposure to equity markets, the use of futures contractrs
3) the tactical variation of its net exposure to equity markets
The strategy primarily seek to add alpha via its long/short (market-neutral) stock portfolio.
- 위에 1번 펀드랑 차이를 모르겠네. 수익도 비슷.

4. AQR MANAGED FUTURES STRATEGY FUND
- Cliff Asness 가 운용
- actively invests in futures and forward contracts both long and short across the global equity, fixed income, commodity and currency markets.
- The fund both use long & short trend following signals
- market reversal 에 신경 쓴다는 일반적인 이야기
- We expect that the correlation of this strategy to the equity markets will average close to zero over a full economic cycle.
- 에쿼티에서 2.6% 까먹고 커머디티에서 5.05% 수익(total 2%)
- Central bank 에 주목 (divergence of  policies)
- 보통 CTA들이 2015 1Q 에 유럽주식쪽의 strong rally 로 많은 수익을 냈다가 그리스 이슈로 많이 잃은듯. ( only to give back some of their gains as issues concerning Greece took center stage, and as the prospect for rising rates in the US became tangible in the second quarter)
- long term 시그널과 short term 시그널이 있는데 long term 의 경우 원자재로 인해 수익을 short term 시그널의 경우 손실을 봄
- 그래도 다른 CTA 전략들 보다는 성과가 좋았다고 이야기.
(SG Trend Index - 대형 헤지펀드 CTA전략 10개? 정도 수익률 모아서 만든 Index 인듯)


5. MULTI-STRATEGY ALTERNATIVE FUND
- 9.25% in 2015 & 7.9% annnualized daily vol, 0 correlation to equities
- There are nine strategies
- Three big gain strategies in 2015
1) Stock Selection Strategies
- Dedicated SHort bias(5.1%)
- Equity Market Neutral(+1.7%)
- Sentiment > growth > high-risk > valuation
2) Event Driven
3) Managed Futures - Trend following


6. RISK-BALANCED COMMODITIES STRATEGY FUND
- 망함

7. RISK PARITY FUND
- Risk parity investing involves allocating to investment by risk, which means that instruments with less risk generally be allocated more capital than instruments that are deemed riskers.
- 많이 깨짐. 약 -8%
- Despite a disappointing year, we stand by our conviction in the Fund's underlying premies and believe that it is a better long-term asset allocation strategy than a traditional equity-risk-centric allocation.
- 60/40 전략 대비 너무 무너짐...

8. STYL PREMIA ALTERNATIV EFUND
- 8.76%
-We employ market-neutral long short strategies across these asset groups based on four investment styles : VALUE, MOMENTUM, CARRY, DEFENSIVE
- 2015 Results
1) Defensive was the top contributor
2) Value : contributed with profits in equity indices, commodities, and fixed income
3) Momentum & Carry : detracted from performance
- Momentum : detracted in fixed income, equity indices and commodities
- Carry :detracted in commodities and currencies

20160614(화) - Japanese government bond yields fall to fresh low

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ac73458c-31d1-11e6-bda0-04585c31b153.html#axzz4BYiI2djN

“We think additional easing is only a matter of time as long as the BoJ adheres to its 2 per cent inflation target,” said Naohiko Baba at Goldman Sachs in Tokyo.

A range of tactical problems make it hard to act this week, however, even if the US Federal Reserve holds rates a day earlier. A dovish message from the Fed could push the yen up even further.

The BoJ’s biggest tactical obstacle is the Brexit referendum. If it eases this week and Britain then votes to leave the EU the yen might rise anyway. That risks fuelling a public perception that BoJ policy is ineffective.

Easing now also risks the appearance of political interference ahead of upper house elections on July 10, while the BoJ will not publish new economic forecasts — accounting for prime minister Shinzo Abe’s decision to postpone a scheduled rise in consumption tax — until its next meeting in July.

All of those factors make July a more likely date for action than June, although BoJ governor Haruhiko Kuroda likes to surprise.

Quant Hedge Fund Balance Computer and Brain Power

http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3558232/asset-management-hedge-funds-and-alternatives/quant-hedge-funds-balance-computer-and-brain-power.html?ArticleId=3558232#/.V04BgWaYtRM.facebook


MAN-AHL

The firm trade four main strategies
1. classical long term trend following
2. proprieatory trend following
3. multistrategy
4. long only

- Man has been developing machine learning algorithms for half a decade.

"But the traders and scientists must know how the algorithms work and how avoid overfitting data to a trading hypothesis.

"You have to understand both the problem and the data, and fit them together carefully"
"You always run the risk of overfitting"


Aspect
- Aspect's trading program is actually seven in one, operating at a range of frequencies by capturing trends of between two weeks and six months.
- Aspect occupies a middle ground, blending human intuition and rigorous research to create trading programs that aren't just autonomous algo.

"Our research approach has always been hypothesis-driven"


WINTON
- Open a San Francisco data science center to tap Silicon Valley's talent
- See a future in building proprietary data sets.
- Winton ventures, a new venture capital unit that is on the hunt for data-driven start ups
- "We are interested in companies where really understanding what can be inferred from the data - drawing valid conclusion from the data - is essential to the success of the business

Directional or Cross-sectional - a matter of choice

https://www.man.com/2/unconventionalviews-2016-sargaison
2016.01.12


Quantitative investment
1. CTA
- much more directional approach to trading

2. Traditional quant equity business
- aim to be market neutral
- to neutralise exposure to the broad equity market by trading only cross-sectional variations in returns
- 'relative value'

과거를 살펴보면 평균적으로 비슷한 퍼포먼스. 하지만 둘의 상관관계는 낮음. (different driving force)
Both have been successful in different conditions over a long period.

어떤 포트폴리오를 구성하고 있는 자산들 간의 상관관계가 fully uncorrelate 상태가 아니라면 자산의 return 에 영향을 미치는 the largest common factor 가 있다고 생각 할 수 있다..

cross sectional 접근과 time-series 접근이 여기서 나뉘는데..
cross sectional 접근은 바로 이 largest common factor 를 제거 하는 것.
그럼 수익률이 소스는?
그 외 다른 smaller factor. 예를들면 Value.

최근에 하버드 연기금을 운용하는 구루인 Stephen Blyth가 말하길,
he felt current markets, with continuing high valuations, were becoming "frothy" and he further stated that they had now
"renewed focus on identifying... managers with demonstrable investment expertise on both the long and short sides of the market."

===>  CTA 가 하는일.

CTA는 지난 18년동안 cross-sectional 전략들과 비슷한 수익률을 가지고 있지만 두달 연속 10%이상 S&P 가 빠졌던 bear 장에서의 수익률은 cross-sectional 보다 훨씬 좋다. (annualized 5.1%)

In the context of a truly diversified portfolio, we believe neutralising all underlying market exposures is seldom the optimal approach, even during periods of extreme stress and acute risk aversions.

IS THERE ANY ALPHA LEFT IN FX?

https://www.man.com/2/is-there-any-alpha-left-in-FX
2015.01.30

In the coming few years, we believe there will be two sources of alpha in FX
1. while big trend have been elusive recently, they are likely to return as economies  start diverging again.
==> This process is already started as the US economy is outperforming

2. There are a number of alpha sources independent of big trends, such as macroeconomic fundamentals an non-trend statistical indicators.

-----------------------------------
EXCHANGE RATE TRENDS WILL RETURN AN ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS DIVERGE

1. Foreign exchange rates reflect the relative economic fundamentals of a pair of countries.

2. When two countries'(or regions) fundamentals diverge significantly over an extended period, the resulting adjustment in their exchange rate often leads to a multi-year trend.

3. Historically, most currency managers based their trading on momentum and carry strategies.

뒤에 붙어있는 References 들에 볼게 좀 있는듯..

꿀

http://www.thebondbeat.com/bondbeat/wp-content/uploads/

Research Paper 목록(작성중)

<Deutsche Bank>
1.QCD Model: DB Quant Handbook, 22 July 2010
2. Signal Processing : Quant Tactical Asset allocation, 19 Sep 2011
3. Signal Processing: New Insights in Country Rotation, 9 Feb 2012
4. Signal Processing: The Rise of the Machines, 5 June 2012
5. Signal Processing: Style Rotation, 7 Sep 2010
6. Signal Processing: Pairs trading with a fundamental flavor, 20 MAr 2012
7. Signal Processing: Portfolios Under Construction: Correlation & Consequences, 24 Jan, 2012
8. Signal Processing: Macro Uncertainty, Investor Sentiment, and Asset Returns, 30 May 2013

<MS>
1. US Quant Research: Agreeing to Disagree : Measurement Error in Equity Factor Models, July 27, 2015)

2. US Equity Stretegy: Growth Matters, May 28, 2013
- 있음

3. US Quant Research: Idiosyncratic Risk Returns, Jan. 11, 2013

4. US Equity Streategy: Seeing Industries in a New Light with PRISM, Sept. 3, 2013

5. US Equity Strategy: Cyclicals or Defensives, Feb. 26, 2012

6. US Equity Strategy: Introducing MOST : Morgan Stanley's Quantitative Stock-Selection Model, Feb 13, 2011)

7. US Equity Strategy: Introducing BEST: Morgan Stanley's New Biannual Equity Selection Tool, Seb 11, 2011)

8. US Equity Strategy: Unemotional Approaches, Oct 4, 2011

9. US Equity Strategy: The Factor Reference Guide, Aug 5, 2014

10. US Quant Research: Quantabees Beware: Explaining Factor Efficacy, Mar 7 2012

11. US Quant Research: Making Factor Consistency Pay Off, Dec 7 2015

12. Global Quantitative Research: Finding Alpha in Global Equity Markets Sep 21 2015

12. US Quant Research: Do Moving Average Crossover Signals Work in Equities? April7. 2016

<Nomura>
Mezrich, Ishikawa, “Decision rules to forecast momentum.” Nomura, 4 September 2012.

20160611(토) - Risk off?

<Facts>
1. Dax : -2.87%
2. S&P E-mini : -0.85%
3. The grobal railly in government bonds
- German, UK and Japanese sovereign bond yields all reached historic lows
- 10Year Bund : 0.01%
- 10Year JGB : -0.15%
- 10Year US-T : down 4bp at 1.64% ( 2Year : 0.73%)
4. Brent oil : -2.7% ( but still up 1.8% on the week)

<Why?>
1. an anxiety over the world economy
- real fears in the markets about global growth
- watch out the price of copper!
2. Britain's referendum on EU membership sent investors racing to safety.
- The polls on Jun 23
- "UK political risk has become the biggest deal in global financial markets, for now" - City Strategist Jonathan Stubbs
3. do not know the effects of negative interest rates in the eurozone and Japan
- Bill Gross : "Supernova that will explode one day"

<Next week>
1. 6.16(Thursday)
 - FOMC & BOJ

20160601_Machine Learning

http://sanghyukchun.github.io/58/

Equities accentuate the positive for May

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d72d63bc-2325-11e6-aa98-db1e01fabc0c.html#axzz49uakPyUz

FT. 20160527.


This week many stock market benchmarks have turned positive for the month,

.... so what has really changed in the space of a few short days?

1.  ...thanks to some robust US housing datas that prime the Fed's narrative of an improving economy, investors evidently feel a lot more comfortable about a nudge higher in overnight interest rate this summer.

2. The feel good vibes are not just confirmed to the US

- Another greek debt deal has bolstered equity markets on the other side of Atlantic.

- A number of EU benchmarks turned positive for May while the UK;s FTSE is up more than 2 percent - mirroring the growing support for a remain vote in Brexit opinion polls.

3. One crucial element has been the rise of Oil

 - buoyed by the expectation of a better balance between supply and demand in the coming months.

- Once more we are seeing how markets value a higher oil price in terms of providing breathing room for highly indebted oil and gas driller

4. Leading the charge for the S&P in May are three sectors that comprise half of the S&P, technology, financials and healthcare.

특히 기술주의 반등...

Fact, Fiction and Momentum Investing

How Can a Strategy Still Work If Everyone Knows About It? by Clifford Asness

1. We're going to argue that certain well-known classic strategies that have worked over the long term will continue to work going forward, though perhaps not at the same level and with different risks than in the past.

2. 알파라고 하는 것은 많은 사람들이 알게 되면 없어지는 성질의 것이다. 사실 과거에 벨류와 같은 특성은 알파의 성질을 가지고 있었을 것 이다. 하지만 재밌는 점은 많은 사람들이 벨류라는 사실을 알게 되었는데도 벨류 주식이 우상향 하는 효과는 없어지지 않았다는 것 이다. 왜 이런 현상이 발생한 걸까? 이런 현상으로 부터 일단 이야기 할 수 있는 것은 벨류효과는 알파가 아니다는 것 아닌가?

왜 그들이 오랜기간 계속해서 우상향 할까?

처음 어떤 전략(밸류)을 발견 했을때 전략의 알파를 향휴하다가, 어느 순간 그 알파를 많은 사람들이 알게 되는 자연스러운 과정에 들어 서는 순간 해당 전략을 사용하는 당신이 생각해 봐야 하는 점이 있다.

1. 그 전략(예를 들어 밸류) 이 앞으로도 계속 작동할 것이라고 진심으로 믿는가? 
(만약 믿는다면 리스크/리턴이 어떻게 변할지에 대해 인지해야 한다.)

2. 해당 전략을 수행하는 수수료가 적당 해야 한가.

만약 위의 두가지가 충족 된다면 나는 그 전략이 매우 특별한 전략이라고 생각 한다.  그들은 매우 낮은 코릴레이션으로 부터 발생하는 수익률의 소스가 될 수 있다.

한가지 농담 해보자.
방안에
1. 산타
2. 버니
3. classic known factor
4. high capacity, truly unique alpha that you can identify ex ante and invest in at a high but fair fee
가 있다고 가정해보자.
어떤 것을 가질래?
정답은 3번이다. 왜냐면 나머지는 세상에 존재하지 않기 때문이다.
(Ok... that's a bit extream, we are always looking for alpha too..)


**
we try to defend data mining many ways - with out-of sample tests across time, geography and asset classes being the most important - and we try to use fundamental economic principles to consider potential tail risks absent from our sample.

**


메인 질문에 대한 답을 해보자.

이 질문에 대한 답을 하기 위해 처음에 왜 그런 전략이 working 했는지에  대해 생각해 봐야 할 것이다.

1. The first reason is they work because the investor is receiving a rational risk premium
- 예를들어 가치주를 생각해보자. 싼 주식이 비싼 주식보다 더 리스크가 크다면 그들이 그에 대한 보상을 합리적으로 받아야 함은 합당하다.
더 리스크가 크다는 뜻은 그 투자는 사실 돈을 잃는 구간 이 있다는 뜻이다.

Winning on average is the compensation you get for the times you lose only if those are very painful times to lose
사실 이 pain 이라는 것이 무엇 인지에 대해서는 아직 의견이 분분하다..

2. 두번째 이유는 투자자들이 실수를 저지르기 때문
behavioral finance 의 전문 분야. 싼 주식은 투자자들의 실수.

물론 두가지는 완전 독립적인 분야는 아니다. 둘다 사실 일수도 있다. 또한 두 가지 효가는 시간이 흐름이 있어서 지속적으로 변할 수 있다. 예를들어 싼 주식은 그 주식이 위험하기 때문에 쌌을수 있으나 닷컴 버블에는 투자자들의 잘못된 행동으로 인해 싸졌을 수 있다.

이부분에 대한 논의는 다음에 더 하기로 하고..

What Happens When a Strategy Becomes Known?

1. 첫번째로 어떤 전략이 "risk"-based reasons으로 움직였다고 가정 해보자.
만약 이럴경우 어떤 전략이 사람들에게 많이 알려졌다 하더라도 잘 working 할 것이다.
물론 그렇다고 할지라도 전략이 노출됨에 따라 전략에 대한 효과가 그대로 유지 된다고 할 수는 없을 것이다. The price of risk(how much you're rewared in extra expected return) 가 변하게 될 것 이다. 어쨌든 rational reason 이 있다는 말 자체는 good news 이다.
하지만 bad news 도 있다.
risk 는 Risky하다는 것이다.
(it has to be pain when pain really hurts!)
매우 불편한 이야기다.. 사실
만약 이것을 판다고 할때 이런 사실을 이야기 해준다는건 사실상 팔지 않겠다는 이야기와 다름 없다..

But it is indeed a reason for the expected return premium associated with bearing this risk to be real.

사실 이런점 때문에 behavioral finance 적인 접근이 우리를 매우 유혹한다.
근데 문제는 behavioral finance 적인 접근은 해당 전략이 사라져 버릴 수 있다는 이야기를 내포하고 있는 점이다..

Expected Return and Risk When a Strategy Becomes Known

**샤프레시오 쓸때 리스크 프리 빼주는 이유가 A 에 투자 안했으면 B 로 효과를 보고 있을 것 이기 때문"

밸류 주식은 싸긴 한데 얼마나 싼지를 측정하는 매져로 value spread라는 것을 사용해서 봄.
사람들이 해당 전략을 알게 됨에 따라 얼마나 포지션이 쏠리는지 그 양을 측정 하기 위해 value spread 라는 것을 도입해서 살펴 보곤 하는데 historical value spread 차트를 그려보면 현시점의 value spread 는 과거에 비해 많이 낮아져 있지 않다.

value spread 같은게 fancy해 보이긴 한데 peak 을 찍고 있을때가 아니면 팩터 timing 을 잡는데는 그다지 도움 안된다.
하지만 value spread 가 낮아지면 적어도 주의를 기울일 필요성 정도는 있는 것 같다.

전략에 대해 많은 사람들이 알게 됨으로써 수익률에 어떻게 영향을 미치는지 정확히 알기는 힘들다. 하지만 value spraed를 살펴보면 it's happend yet!

분모인 변동성 부분에 대해 어떤일이 일어날지 생각해 보는 것은 좀더 어렵다.
생각해보면, 사람들이 많이 몰릴수록 crisis가 일어 났을때 많은 사람들이 한꺼번에 특정 전략에서 빠져나가기 때문에 그 위험성은 더 크다는 것을 생각 할 수 있다.
또한 큰 돈이 들어오고 나가면서 생기는 flow 가 변동성 자체를 증가 시킴으로써 샤프를 낮출 수 있다.(Essentially flows now become a new source of day-to-day vol)

value spread와 같이 realized vol 을 value strategy 에 대해 그려 보았다.(rolling 50year monthly vol of the strategy)
market vol 효과를 제거 했을때 이것또한 과거에 비해 큰 이슈가 아님을 알 수 있었다.

Can We Say More About Current attractiveness?

심지어 아직까지 가장 유명한 팩터인 value에 대해서 큰 문제가 발견되지 않았다!
Remember, just because they are now known doesn't mean everyone believes in them or is comfortable with them

Advice to Investors

지금과 같이 많이 연구되고 많이 알려 졌으나 아직 too much well known 되지 않았고 없어지지 않은 팩터들이 있는 상황에서 우리는 어떻게 행동해야 할까?
1. 수익을 기대 하긴 하나 과거와 같은 정도의 수익은 기대하지 않는다.
하지만, 과거와 같은 정도의 수익은 채권 혹은 지수에서도 기대하기 힘들 것 이기 때문에 이 러한 전략들을 포트에 추가 하면서 효과를 보는 일은 더욱더 중요하다고 할 수 있을 것이다.
2. 위에서도 이야기 했지만 금융위기시에 해당 전략들이 더욱더 쉽게 무너질 수 있을 것이라는 사실을 인지하고 있는다. 하지만 long-term 을 보면 수익을 향유할 수 있다.
짧은 기간의 큰 변동성에 포기 하지 않고 살아 남을 수 있을 정도의 돈을 투자 해라.



In conclusion
자신만의 독특한 알파를 추구하는 전략을 가지는 것은 매우 환상적인 일이다. 하지만 독특한 방법으로 알파를 추구하는 전략일수록 해당 전략을 평가하기는 더욱더 힘들어 진다. "Skilil versus luck & data mining versus lucky good draw" 를 파악하기 더욱더 힘들어 진다. 또한 해당 다른 사람들이 해당 알파를 알게 됨으로써 그 알파는 사라져 버릴 것 이다. 잘 알려진 팩터를 분산투자 해라.

The Siren Song of Factor Timing by Clifford S. asness

Siren song : 유혹하는 말

1. 대부분 연구들에서는 Return 에 주목

• How strong are they?
• How robust are they?
• "Robustness" meaning do they pass a series of tests of reasonableness including working out-of-sample and fitting a sensible economic story.
• what particular combination of these factors one should hold in an optimal portfolio

2. Factor timing
Why do I call factor timing a "siren song" in my title?
Well, factor timing is very tempting and, unfortunately, very difficult to do well.
"I argue that factor timing is highly analogous to timing the stock market"

2015년 논문에서 factor timing 을 "sin"이라고 불렀고 timing 을 정 원하면 basic value and trend indicators 를 이용해서 "sin a little" 하라고 이야기 했다.

"Given my belief in the main factors described above - that is I do not think they're the result of data mining or will disappear in the future - the implication is to maintain passive exposures to them with small if any variance through time.

20160505(목)_다음논문

1. Tobias Moskowitz_Chicago Booth
 http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/tobias.moskowitz/research/chronology.html#2014

2. Andrea Frazzini_ AQR
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~af227/

Value and Momentum Everywhere by Clifford S. Asness

1. We offer new insights into these two market anomalies by examining their returns jointly across eight diverse markets and asset classes.

2. Provide several key questions about these pervasive market phenomena

• How much variation exists in value and momentum premia across markets and asset classes?
• How correlated are value and momentum returns across these diverse markets and asset classes with different geographines, structures, investor types, and securities?
• What are the economic drivers of value and momentum premia and their correlation structure?
• What is a natural benchmark model for portfolios of global securities across different asset classes?

<What they found>

1. Consistent and ubiquitous evidence of value and momentum return premia across all the markets we study, including

• Government bonds : Value and momentum
• Currencies and commodities : Value

2. They found significant comovement in value and momentum strategies across diverse asset classes.

• Value strategies are positively correlated with other value strategies across otherwise unrelated markets
• Momentum strategies across diverse asset classes
• Value and Momentum are negatively correlated with each other within and across asset classes.

3. The striking comovement pattern across asset classes is one of our central findings and suggests the presence of common global factors related to value and momentum.

...

4. We show that separate factors for value and momentum best explain the data, rather than a single factor, since both strategies produce positive returns on average yet are negatively correlated.

5. We investigate the source of this common global factor structures.

• Modest link - Macroeconomic factor
• Significant evidence - liquidity risk(negatively related with value and positively related with momentum) ==> Value 와 Momentum의 negative correlation 의 일부분은 여기서 나온다고 생각할 수 있다.
• Funding risk - Importance of it increase more and more. 
• 이 결과들은 gained by looking across many markets at once

6. 사실 liquidity risk 는 많은 부분을 설명하지는 못한다. 특히 Value 와 Momentu을 합쳤을때의 우수한 결과는 liquidity risk 가 희석된 상태. ==> Hence, funding liquidity risk can only provide a partial and incomplete explanation for momentum, but cannot explain the value premium or the value and momentum combination premium.

7. 우리가 밝은 단서들이 value and momentum premia의 존재를 설명하는 단서가 된다. 

• 예를들어 두 팩터의 강한 음의 상관관계는 두 팩터를 모두 설명할 수 있는 하나의 리스크 요인이 존재할 수 있음을 이야기 해주는 단서가 된다. 
• 반대로 이러한 상관관계는 behavioral model의 존재에 대한 단서는 아니다.

8. 여러 자산들을 통해 발견한 value 와 momentum 에 대한 결과로 인해 rational asset pricing 이론들로(firm investment risk or firm growth options을 이용한) Value 와 Momentum 에 관한 프리미엄을 설명하는데는 무리가 있음을 알 수 있다. currencies, government bonds, commodities에서 발견한 것들을 설명할 수 없다.

9. 논문에서 Value와 Momentum 을 측정하는 방법 

• Stock : BE / ME (book to market ratio)
• Book Value의 경우 6개월 lagged to ensure data availability
• Momentum : 과거 12개월 return
• 최근 1개월은 skip which is standard in the momentum literature to avoid the 1-month reversal in stock returns -> 관련논문 참고, liquidity issue 가 있다는데...??
• 다른 asset classes 
• Momentum : 다른 asset에서는 최근 1개월을 삭제 하지 않아도 됨(liquidity issue가 적음) 또한 최근 1개월 포함할때 성과 좋음. 하지만 이 논문에서는 equity랑 똑같이 맞춰줌(1개월 삭제) , 보수적
• Value  : 주식같은 value 가 없음. 따라서 모든 자산 class에 같은 기준을 적용하기 힘들다. 
• country indices : 전 월의 BE/ME ratio for the MSCI index of the country
• 기타 다른 자산 : log of the spot price 5 years ago ( actually, the average spot price from 4.5 to 5.5 years ago) divided by the most recent spot price
• 이렇게 하는게 통계적으로 의미가 있음. 관련 논문 참고.

10. 포트폴리오 구성은 3분위로 구성

• 주식 : 시총으로 비율
• 기타 : equal weight

11. Value and Momentum Factors
각각은 HIgh - low 로 구성. 비율의 경우 개별 rank - cross-sectional average rank of that signal.

12. 벤치마크 설정

• 개별주식 : 각각 나라 MSCI index
• Country index : world index
• 나머지 자산 : equal-weighted basket of the securities in each asset class

<결론>
1. 모든 주식시장에서 Value 주식의 선전. Japan에서 특히 가장 강
2. 모멘텀 또한 강함. 특히 유럽에서. 일본에서 통계적 유의성이 좀 약함.
3. Value 와  Momentum의 상관관계가 대략 -0.6 정도. 둘다 positive series이기 때문에 둘을 섞으면 매우 좋아질 거라고 예상 가능
4. 일본시장에서 사실 밸류가 상대적으로 매우 강해서 모멘텀이 약한데(코릴은 낮기 때문에) 이런 일본 시장에서도 벨류와 모멘텀을 섞으면 샤프가 더 좋아짐
5. 개별 국가들을 섞어 global portfolio를 만들었을때 샤프가 크게 좋아지지 않는 모습을 볼때, Value 는 Value끼리 Corr 이 높고 Mom은 Mom끼리 Corr이 높다고 생각 가능
6. 모든 자산에 대해서도 포트폴리오를 구성해 봤다.

• 개별 자산의 vol 차이가 매우 크기 때문에 1/vol 로 weight을 줘서 계산 해 봤는데 샤프가 그다지 향상되지 않았다.
• 즉 모든 자산간에 해당 팩터들에서 상관성이 존재 한다는 이야기

20160424 - 현재 매크로 상황 정리

시장을 크게 네가지 국면으로 나눠 보자. 2x2.

리스크 온
리스크 오프
x
Us Treasury yield High
Us Treasury yield Low

2016.1월 초 : 12월 FOMC, 금리 올림. 과거에 질러놓은 이야기 때문에 시장의 기대(상승한 금리)에 부합하는 행동이 차라리 행동을 하지 않는 것보다 시장에 주는 충격에 덜 할 것이라고 생각. 금리 인상. 중국+이머징 작살. 현재와 같은 상항에서 금리를 올리면 어떻게 되는지 알게 됨. 앞으로 쉽게 금리를 올리지는 못 할 것.
===> Risk Off &  Us Treasury Yield headed to Low

2016. 02.11 ~ 2016.03 중순 : 시장이 지나치게 빠졌던 상황에서 반등. (2월 11일 S&P 저점. Double bottom). 건강한 강세장의 모습 이었음.
===> Risk On & Us Treasury Yield headed to High

2016.03 중순 ~ 20160410정도? : 201603 중순을 기점으로 주가 상승 & 금리 상승이 함께 있는 상황은 종료 됨.  S&P 입장에서 현재 레벨을 돌파하기 위해서는 또 다른 에너지가 필요한 부담 스러운 레벨 이었는데 중앙은행 발 달러 약세로 인해 한 레벨 더 오를 수 있었음. 금리 안정적, 유가 상승, 주가 상승.
===> Risk On & Us Treasury Yield Headed to Low

20160410 ~ 현재 : 지속적으로 Risk On. Risk On의 관성이 남아 있는 시점. Risk On 을 원해서 모든걸 Risk On 의 신호로 해석하고 있는 단계. 다만 지금 눈여겨 볼 점은 금리가 상승하기 시작 했다는 것.
===>  Risk On & Us Treasury Yield has started to go High


현재 : 달러 약세의 바닥을 테스트 하는 지점. 달러 약세가 강세로 추세 전환 하기 위해서는 에너지가 필요. 어떤 에너지가 있을까?
모건스탠리 - 20160415 보고서

Additionally, our FX team notes the following triggers for a resumption of USD strength: i) Weaker EM data and in particular in China, where our base case is that this happens in 2H16 as the fiscal stimulus fades; 
ii) Additional easing measures by DM central banks to fight the USD weakness, notably Japan; --> 4월 28일 BOJ 
iii) Continued closing of the US output gap, sparking questions about how long the Fed can remain on hold;
 iv) Commodity prices reversing the recent rally. Specifically on oil, our oil strategists believe disappointment will come from non-compliance with any potential deal. 

Finally, we also think core rates represent a important risk due to the very low levels, particularly given that markets are now reaching lows similar to a year ago, which were indeed followed by a sharp sell-off. 

2. 일본
최근 옌이 강했는데 니케이가 올랐다.!


3. 중국

4. 유럽

5. 한국
- 원달러 : 주요 이평선을 다 깨고 내려 왔는데 굳이 떨어지는 칼날을 받을 필요가 있는가 싶다.
- 채권 : 1.43% 찍고 현재 1.47%

수익률 계산

1. Equity 포트폴리오를 총 얼마 매입 했는지를 계산 (첫날 매입 금액)

2. 선물 포트폴리오를 매입 하는데 비용이 얼만큼 들었는지 계산

3. 1+2 를 총 사용 금액으로 결정
  - 현재는 현물 7 : 선물 1 의 비율로 사용 금액을 결정. 즉 3번 고정.


4. Daily 수익률 계산

1. Daily equity 누적 수익률 계산 = Equity 누적 벌어드린 금액 총 합계 / 3
1. Daily equity 당일 수익률 계산 = 1 / t-1일 누적
2. 참고 : 분모를 선물 사는데 필요한 돈으로 수정 해주기 전 pure 한 수익률도 표시해 준다.
2. Daily 선물 누적 수익률 계산 = 선물 누적 벌어드린 금액 총 합계 / 3
1. 선물 누적 벌어드린 총 합계 계산 시, 

	코스닥매입금	계약수	종가
20160401	600	-10	600
20160402	605	-3	603
20160403	607	-1	605
20160404	604	1	604
20160405			605

이런 정보를 바탕으로 당일 까지 누적 금액 계산하기
==> daily 수익률은 t일까지 누적 수익률 /t-1 일까지의 누적 수익률


5. Daily




**** Equity 포트가 오름으로써 생길 수 있는 비용에 관한 문제
1. 선물 가격이 떨어 지면서 추가 납입금이 늘어 날 수 있음
2. Equity 포트의 notional 이 커짐으로써 Short 을 해줘야 하는 계약수가 늘어남

CH15 : Performance Measurement and Attribution

Performance attribution dissects the return in order to pinpoint the exact sources of value

Important function of performance measurement is to determine whether the portfolio manager outperformed or underperformed the benchmark and whether the difference was due to skill or luck.

Source of excess returns is key to understanding how well and efficiently the factor model and all other parts of the investing strategy are working.


15.2 Measuring returns

CH3 : Basic QEPM Models

3.2 Basic QEPM models and portfolio construction procedures

There are two generic factor models that are used to determine how stock returns and risks vary with factors

• Fundamental factor model
• Economic factor model

They employ different techniques for modeling stock returns.

Average stock return is determined by the product of the factor premium and the factor exposure.

• Factor premium : How much investors are willing to pay for each factor 
• Fundamental factor model : Must be estimated with historical relationships between stock returns and factor exposure
• Economic factor medel : Can be determined up to a propotionality without a statical estimation in certain cases
• Factor exposure : measures how sensitive the stock return is to a factor
• Fundamental factor model (ex> p/e, marketcap..) : directly observerable 
• Economic factor model  : Must be estimeated

<Steps>

3.2.1 Factor Choice

3.2.2 The data decision

• Cross-sectional dimension : The cross-sectional dimension defines a data set by the characteristics of the stocks it includes 
• 특정 data set 의 특징은  최종 포트폴리오에 영향을 미칠 것이다.
• 특정 data set 에 속한 주식의 숫자는 estimation을 쉽게 만들 것이다.
• Time-series dimension : 

3.2.3 Factor Exposure

• Fundamental factor model : easy
• Economic factor model : 뒤에서 이야기 하겠지만 먼저 factor premium을 계산하고, 이 factor premium과 return과의 관계를 통해서 계산한다.

3.2.4 Factor Premium

20160209_Some articles

1. 5 Things You Have To Learn From Kyle Bass

http://blog.stocktwits.com/5-things-we-learned-from-kyle-bass/

2. 'Risk Parity' strategy shows strain
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8542e88e-cea6-11e5-92a1-c5e23ef99c77.html#axzz3zfwok1Cd

Last year was a terrible one for “risk parity”, once one of the hottest strategies in the investment world, as losses mounted and some analysts blamed it for exacerbating market turbulence. So far 2016 has offered little respite.

...

But the performance started to sag in 2014, and nosedived last year, ruining its reputation for resilience in almost any conditions. The Salient Risk Parity index slumped 12 per cent in 2015 and JPMorgan’s gauge of risk parity fund performance fell more than 8 per cent.

...

Even pioneers of the strategy have suffered a bad time. Bridgewater’s “All Weather” risk parity fund lost 7.7 per cent last year and is down about 10 per cent net of fees since July 2014, according to a person familiar with the matter.

....

Adding to the woes(Commodity), bonds — a big part of risk parity portfolios — have failed to act as a suitable counterweight for the once seemingly bulletproof strategy.

....

“Rates have historically done well in environments like this, but last year we got nothing out of it,” says Mr Knight....“This is a world where there are some purists, and the theory underpinning risk parity is strong, so there aren’t that many that change their approach,” he says. “I don’t consider myself a purist, and there are some regimes that aren’t that risk parity friendly.”

...

The crucial question is whether this bout of underperformance is an unpleasantly long but still temporary blip, the start of a new risk parity-unfriendly market regime, or even a symptom of something more broadly awry in the fundamental assumptions underpinning the strategy.

Industry insiders are still confident it is the first, and are hopeful that a turnround beckons. Bridgewater’s All Weather fund is still “a much better ‘sleep at a night’ portfolio than any single asset class and most portfolios”, argues an executive at the hedge fund.

Similarly, Mr Mendelson at AQR says that apart from some minor implementation tweaks he has not changed anything as a result of market movements. “Systematic investing does best when you run a consistent process that doesn’t change in response to short-term fluctuations,” he argues.

3. 스마트베타, 패시브와 액티브 모두의 대안
http://m.thebell.co.kr/m/newsview.asp?svccode=00&newskey=201602010100002350000145

4. Hedgeable
https://www.hedgeable.com/hedgeable-investment-philosophy-white-paper#capm

...

Eliminating 75% of the losses during these two periods has an immense effect on portfolio growth, adding more than $1 million over 25 years. For a hard-working American investing for retirement, that extra $1 million can significantly boost their standard of living.

MPT based index investing will never achieve this kind of loss reduction; an MPT philosophy inherently accepts all losses and thus represents a huge opportunity cost for long-term investors.

...

Contrary to what the MPT zealots have made the public believe, managers have been able to achieve the kind of loss reduction shown above. Consider the tangible example of the performance of Bridgewater Associates’ Pure Alpha Fund (the firm where Hedgeable CEO Mike Kane began his career) versus the S&P:

Bridgewater produced a return that nearly doubled that of the S&P with about half the volatility, and a (-14.18%) max drawdown, thus cutting out 75.03% of the losses. Bridgewater is an alternative manager that invests in futures, options, and other vehicles that are typically only purchased for wealthy or sophisticated investors. But what if we could echo this sort of risk-managed profile by using large, liquid ETFs and stocks instead of complicated ultra-high-net-worth instruments? Later in this paper, we will explore how Hedgeable has disrupted the market by making that possible and available to everyone.

...

5. ‘Robo-advisers’ try to calm investor nerves
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3a44af14-c6ec-11e5-808f-8231cd71622e.html#axzz3zfwok1Cd

Daniel Egan, director of behavioural finance and investing at New York-based Betterment, said the firm had received higher volumes of calls and emails in recent weeks, and was trying to ease concerns by providing “very personalised, very positive” notifications when customers log in.

6. Which robos got off to the fastest start in 2016?

http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160115/FREE/160119956/which-robos-got-off-to-the-fastest-start-in-2016

 

2016 1월 현재 로보어드바이져 AUM 2015 01과 비교